Sudan’s map of control splits east and west The army warns of a “Libyan model” and resists the US plan to end the war

The map below shows the latest areas of control held by the warring parties: the Sudanese army and its allies on one side, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies on the other. The key hinge between these two large zones is the Kordofan region, where fierce battles and direct clashes are raging.

It should be noted that the desert, North Darfur and North Kordofan in particular contain vast expanses with no permanent garrison belonging to either side, which mobile units can cross freely. These are therefore better described as approximate zones of influence and control than as sealed military boundaries.

Geographically, North Kordofan is the main hinge between the two large zones controlled by the army and the RSF.

In recent months the army has shifted from defending El Obeid to advancing north and west. Its capture of Sodari has also shrunk the RSF’s presence in North Kordofan, while, according to local sources, the next battles are centred on Al-Mazroub, Um Badr and Hamrat al-Sheikh, as well as on the El Obeid–En Nahud axis.

If the army were to push from El Obeid to En Nahud, it would be entering West Kordofan, currently one of the most important belts connecting Darfur with the oil-producing areas to the south.

The RSF, for its part, needs to keep this belt intact. It controls En Nahud and the Heglig oil area, and oil industry sources reported in September 2026 that crude from South Sudan was still flowing through Heglig, which remains under its control.

The Blue Nile front is different. After the RSF and its allies retook Kurmuk and Geissan in August 2026, their alliance with al-Hilu’s forces advanced to further military positions in Bakori and Sarkam. In September 2026, fighting broke out in Al-Keili and Maqaja, while drone attacks on Ed Damazin continued.

The Ed Damazin–Roseires line is a sensitive one for the army. The fall of forward positions south of the two towns would not only mean losing ground in Blue Nile; it would open a path towards Sennar and Gezira and force the army to split its forces between the western front in Kordofan and a distant south-eastern one, according to a report by Critical Threats, which noted that control of Kurmuk and Geissan opens routes towards the agricultural heartland and the Nile Valley.

Khartoum and Gezira are no longer the main arenas of ground combat they were in 2023–2025. The army controls both, but the RSF retains the ability to launch drone attacks on Khartoum, Omdurman and deep into army-held territory.

As a result, the war has effectively shifted to:

Recent reports indicate that the most significant drone attacks are concentrated in Blue Nile, followed by Kordofan.

Where are drone attacks concentrated?

• Blue Nile: the clearest hotspot.
• Kordofan: strikes and interception attempts.
• Khartoum, Gezira and Sennar: repeated attacks far from the front lines.

These incidents show drones being used in tandem with ground operations, with their impact reaching residential neighbourhoods and camps for displaced people.

This reading is based on incidents reported over the past week. It therefore describes a pattern visible in media coverage and is not a comprehensive record of sorties or strikes over the past months.

Blue Nile has thus emerged as the clearest focal point of this escalation. On 7 October, an RSF drone hit homes and a mosque in the al-Hijra neighbourhood of Ed Damazin, killing at least four women.

On 9 October 2026, a gathering of displaced people in Abu Shendi was hit by a strike that killed 41 people, including eight children.

Forty-one people, including eight children, were killed in a strike on a gathering of displaced people in Abu Shendi; at least four women were killed when a drone hit homes and a mosque in Ed Damazin; and six civilians were wounded in a drone attack on El Obeid.

On the other side, local media reported that army drone strikes targeted movements of the RSF and the SPLM-N in Wad al-Mahi locality.

In Kordofan, the drone war has played out through both strikes and interception attempts.

Local outlets reported that six civilians were wounded and homes and vehicles damaged in a drone attack on El Obeid on 9 October 2026, which they attributed to the RSF.

On 5 October, the army also announced that it had shot down an FH-95 drone north-west of Al-Khuwei, without identifying its operator in the statement as reported.

Central states such as Khartoum, Gezira and Sennar have faced repeated RSF drone attacks: although these areas lie far from the zones of direct fighting, they continue to be hit by drones again and again.

The nature of the reported targets points to two likely functions for the drones. The first is directly military: striking troop movements, weapons depots and supply lines, as described in reports of army operations in Blue Nile and Kordofan.

The Sudanese army’s official track for a settlement rests on the peace initiative of Prime Minister Kamil Idris’s government, which was presented to the UN Security Council in December 2025 and relaunched by the government during 2026.

Its basic sequence is:

But the real disagreement is over the sequence.

Under the US proposal put forward in the summer of 2026, Washington wanted an immediate 90-day humanitarian truce, followed by negotiations on a permanent ceasefire and a transfer of power to civilians.

The army-led government accepted large parts of the proposal, but insisted that any deal must include the RSF’s withdrawal from all the cities it has seized, not merely partial pullbacks.

Alongside this, since May, Burhan has opened a second track: a “Sudanese–Sudanese dialogue” held inside the country.

In August and September, the Dialogue Preparatory Committee began reaching out to political parties and civilian forces, and the authorities offered participants legal and security guarantees, including dropping some complaints filed by state institutions against figures living abroad if they return to take part.

According to the government’s account, the state will provide protection and facilities but will not set the dialogue’s agenda or determine its outcomes.

Burhan also said on 10 September that the dialogue is reserved for political and civilian forces and that the military will not take part.

The Quintet — the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, the Arab League and IGAD — visited Khartoum last September and sought to link this internal dialogue to the international track. It stressed, however, that the political process must run in parallel with concrete steps to halt the fighting and protect civilians, and that the intended outcome is a transition leading to democratic civilian rule.

This is where the main gap between the competing paths to peace lies: the United States wants a truce first and without preconditions, while the official line of the Sudanese authorities in practice ties an end to the war to fundamental security arrangements concerning the RSF.

On 22 September 2026, the US State Department said explicitly that, in Washington’s view, neither the army nor the RSF had made “serious commitments” to an immediate truce, and that the United States had asked both to accept it without preconditions.

On 26 September 2026, Burhan said once again that his goal was to end what he calls the “rebellion”, a sign that the military track remains very much alive alongside the political one.

Statements by the RSF leadership show that its vision for ending the war rests on “a humanitarian truce followed by a broad political and security settlement addressing the shape of the state and the future of the military establishment”.

Welcoming negotiations, however, does not mean accepting withdrawal or disarmament in advance — and this is where the gap between the RSF’s position and the Sudanese army’s demands becomes clear.

This assessment draws on dated statements and reports, some older than the past week, and distinguishes between Hemedti’s public remarks and details attributed to unnamed officials.

In a direct public statement, RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”, announced in a recorded speech on 24 November 2025 that he accepted a three-month humanitarian truce and agreed to an international mechanism to monitor it.

According to Al Jazeera, he said: “We announce a humanitarian truce that includes a cessation of hostilities for three months, and agree to the formation of an international monitoring mechanism.”

The statement establishes public acceptance of the principle of a cessation of hostilities and outside monitoring, but it is not in itself evidence that the truce was implemented.

Hemedti reaffirmed this stance in a speech marking Eid al-Fitr on 20 March 2026, declaring his agreement to a serious humanitarian truce that would allow aid to reach those in need, open safe corridors and protect displaced people and refugees — but on condition that the truce not be exploited for military or political ends.

In the same speech, he set out a vision that goes beyond a halt to the fighting towards “re-founding the state and establishing democratic civilian rule”, coupled with hostile rhetoric towards the Islamists.

His stated position thus combines acceptance of a humanitarian de-escalation with demands for broader political and institutional change.

In July 2026, Reuters quoted a senior RSF official as saying the group had received the US peace proposal, welcomed it and submitted a written response, without disclosing its contents.

According to documents seen by the agency, the proposal included an immediate 90-day humanitarian truce, negotiations on a permanent ceasefire, a transition led by civilian forces, and arrangements for a unified national army.

The official’s welcome, however, does not prove that the RSF agreed to every clause.

Wider details of the negotiating position were published by Sudan Tribune on 15 July 2026, citing a senior RSF figure who asked not to be named.

According to his account, the RSF and its allies agreed to a three-month truce and to facilitating relief, but refused to withdraw from the areas they control, and demanded the creation of a new army and the exclusion of the National Congress Party and its fronts from the political process.

The official also spoke of an independent investigation into abuses and of cooperation with the International Criminal Court.

Those details, however, are attributed to a source inside the RSF; they are neither a published official statement nor the original text of the document, and could not be verified directly.

The RSF’s position therefore clashes with the army’s demand for a full withdrawal from the cities it has seized first, rather than the limited pullbacks set out in the US proposal.

In short, the RSF seeks to negotiate while keeping its cards on the ground, whereas the army demands measures that would curtail that strength before any settlement is concluded.

In a statement on 22 September 2026, the US State Department said Washington considers that “the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces and their leaders do not represent legitimate, constitutional governance in Sudan”.

This US position comes in the context of the roadmap led by Washington within the Quad, which was announced on 12 September 2025 with the participation of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

The US proposal calls for a three-month humanitarian truce, followed by a permanent ceasefire and then a transitional process to be completed within nine months, leading to the formation of a civilian government.

The Sudanese army, however, has voiced concern about the US plan, arguing that it pushes the country towards a “Libyan model”.

Reuters quoted a senior adviser to Sudan’s army-led government as saying the US proposal could push the country towards a Libya-style partition, in what were among the sharpest criticisms of the plan by a Sudanese official to date.

The remarks came a week after the US administration withheld a visa for army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to attend the UN General Assembly in New York, because he had not yet accepted the proposal.

The US proposal was put forward by Massad Boulos, the senior US adviser for Arab and African affairs.

Amjad Farid, adviser to the Sovereignty Council for political affairs and foreign relations, said the government had submitted its proposed amendments to the agreement — chief among them the RSF’s withdrawal from urban areas under international supervision — but that the United States appeared to have ignored them, Reuters reported.

He added:

Two Sudanese diplomats, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak publicly, said a Sudanese delegation had been preparing to meet Boulos in Washington last week to discuss a ceasefire, but the meeting was cancelled after Burhan’s visa was withheld.

The Sudanese army’s resistance to the US proposal thus appears to have angered the US administration.

The positions of Sudan’s leading leftist forces converge on calls to end the war, restore civilian rule and hold perpetrators of abuses to account. That convergence, however, does not amount to a unified leftist position on political alliances or international mediation.

The differences become clear when comparing the Sudanese Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Baath Party led by Ali al-Rayah al-Sanhouri, and the Unionist Socialist Democratic Party, known as “Hashd al-Wahdawi”.

For the Sudanese Communist Party, ending the war is bound up with rebuilding civilian authority, not merely with an agreement between military leaders. In a memorandum to the Addis Ababa consultations dated 3 June 2026, the party called for trade unions, resistance committees, women, young people, displaced people and refugees to be included in the political process, and rejected any military partnership, which it said undermines democratic rule.

It made accountability for war crimes and abuses part of any settlement, and welcomed international and regional efforts to halt the fighting and deliver relief — provided their role was limited to facilitation and support.

In a more recent position, the party’s political bureau rejected, in a statement dated 16 September 2026, the dialogue called by the Port Sudan authorities, describing it as “an attempt to give the ruling authority political cover and to reorganise the forces that benefit from the continuation of the war”.

Instead, it proposed uniting grassroots forces to end the fighting and restore the path of the December revolution. This is a position on the body organising the dialogue, its conditions and its likely outcomes, alongside an insistence on ending the war as the priority.

Nor does the Communist Party shy away from condemning the RSF. In its statement on the Nairobi Charter, dated 3 June, it criticised what it saw as the absence of a clear condemnation of the crimes committed by the RSF and its allied militias, while holding both warring parties responsible for abuses.

It called for the militias to be dissolved and for a single, professional national army under the supervision of a civilian government.

Its position thus combines rejection of military rule with rejection of the RSF’s continued existence as an independent military force.

The Arab Socialist Baath Party, led by al-Sanhouri, places direct negotiations to end the war at the forefront of its message. Its spokesman, Adil Khalafalla, told Madameek in an interview on 14 August 2026 that the party rejects using war to seize power or settle disputes, and calls for it to be halted immediately through negotiations, without recognising the political outcomes it has produced.

He proposed a one-year civilian transition ending in elections, explaining that the party had engaged positively with the Quintet mechanism while criticising its working methods.

Openness to mediation, however, has not stopped the Baath Party from rejecting Burhan’s dialogue. In remarks to Sudan Tribune on 24 August, Wagdi Salih linked this rejection to the fact that the invitation came from one of the warring parties, stressing that the party would not take part in any dialogue that does not lead to an end to the war.

Here the Baath and the Communists meet in opposing the reproduction of military rule, though they differ in their approach to alliances and political paths.

Hashd al-Wahdawi sums up its position as “positive neutrality”. In a statement on 8 September 2026, it said it supports neither of the warring parties, held both “responsible for the October 2021 coup”, and rejected the notion that either has a mandate to lead the state, calling for the armed forces to be restructured into a professional army removed from politics and partisanship.

Disagreement within this part of the left, however, centres on how to turn opposition to the war into a practical political path — over the limits of negotiation, the terms of mediation, the representation of popular forces, and guarantees against a return to military partnership.

An end to the fighting, civilian rule and accountability nonetheless remain shared demands across the sources cited, though this does not allow a single position to be attributed to all of Sudan’s leftist organisations and figures.

Among civilian forces, Hamdok stands out as a key figure in setting out the positions of the various camps.

Former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok advocates a path based on ending the war through negotiations and diplomatic pressure, followed by a transition to civilian rule.

During his engagements in New York in September 2026, the Sumud alliance he leads called for international and regional efforts to be unified and for the humanitarian, security and political tracks to be linked, while preserving Sudan’s unity and sovereignty.

The delegation presented this vision at a meeting with UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed on 20 September.

The alliance’s position goes beyond a general call for peace. In a letter to the United Nations and the Security Council on 22 September 2026, the civilian forces called for an immediate and comprehensive humanitarian truce, the protection of civilians, the extension of the arms embargo to all of Sudan, and accountability for perpetrators of abuses — demands that overlap with the US proposal.

They also rejected “conferring legitimacy on authorities that emerged from a coup or by force of arms”, as they put it, and called for a political process leading to a democratic civilian transition.

On 13 September 2026, a statement from the Sudanese army lent weight to the “Sisi model” comparison that has been circulating since the army-led government took shape.

In an interview with Egypt’s Al-Shorouk newspaper, Yasser al-Atta, the army’s chief of staff and a member of the Sovereignty Council, said the army “does not want to rule the country”, but outlined a scenario in which the commander-in-chief of the armed forces would serve as head of state through the next three or four elections, while parliamentary elections would produce a government in charge of the executive.

He also said the army leadership would push for Burhan to remain at the top of the state “for a number of terms” until political parties become stronger and better able to run the country, as he put it.

Atta revealed that more than one scenario is being considered within the army leadership. In one, the commander-in-chief would remain head of state for the first term while the winning parties run the executive; he would then retire from the army and be free to stand in the following election.

As for his personal view, he said the commander-in-chief — whoever that may be — should be head of state, alongside an executive government formed through parliamentary elections.

A leaked document dated 16 June 2026, published by an Irish website and attributed to Burhan’s office, described a five-year transitional period led by a president of the republic with a technocratic government, followed by elections, as well as an internal Sudanese dialogue and the rejection of the outcomes of foreign initiatives.

Some media outlets have long drawn parallels between Burhan’s political trajectory and the path that brought Sisi to power in Egypt.

In an article titled “From Sisi to Burhan: Why Sudan needs to build the state before searching for its president”, published on 19 August 2026, Professor Makki Madani al-Shibli discussed speculation that the formation of a legislative council could pave the way for Burhan to move from leading the army and chairing the Sovereignty Council to the presidency, following Sisi’s path. He explicitly describes this as speculation, however, and stresses that Sudan’s circumstances differ from Egypt’s.

In an analysis titled “Cairo doubles down on Sudan’s army but backs a fading bet”, published on 27 June 2026, Modern Diplomacy described Burhan as representing an authoritarian model familiar to Sisi, and linked Egypt’s support to its preference for military leadership in Sudan.

Older sources made similar points. Alex de Waal wrote for the World Peace Foundation on 19 April 2023 that Burhan takes Sisi as his model and sees the military as a sovereign authority standing above the political sphere.

Abdelmonem Omar of Fikra Forum, writing for The Washington Institute on 21 July 2023, used the term “Sisi model” to describe what he saw as an Egyptian desire to establish a military regime with a civilian facade in Sudan.

That analysis attributes this orientation to Cairo, however, and offers no direct evidence of Burhan’s own intentions.

Mohamed Salih Omar, director of the African Center for Research and Policy Studies, told Arabic Post that some voices are calling for Burhan to continue leading the country in the next phase, citing his role in leading the war and the support they believe he enjoys.

He cautioned, however: “These are merely opinions being floated; we cannot say they have become public opinion,” adding that the army likely sees itself as the body best placed to bring Sudanese together and lead the transitional period, until political consensus is reached at later stages.

On the US proposal to end the war, Omar said the core of the army’s objection is its refusal to allow the RSF to remain a party to any future political landscape.

According to his reading, the army’s vision is for the RSF to leave the cities and areas it controls for agreed locations, possibly under the supervision of mediators, then lay down its weapons and begin disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration arrangements for Sudanese fighters.

He added that this vision includes returning foreign fighters to their home countries, pointing to the presence, by his account, of fighters from South Sudan, Colombia and other African countries in the RSF’s ranks.

The army’s vision, as Mohamed Salih Omar reads it:

• The RSF leaves the cities and areas it holds.
• Its forces gather at agreed locations, possibly with mediators.
• It lays down its weapons.
• Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Sudanese fighters.
• Foreign fighters are returned home: South Sudan, Colombia and other African countries.

Omar said the army’s rejection of the US and Quad proposals stems from its belief that they offer the RSF a route back into political life, adding that the army and its allies see this as a “reward” for a force they accuse of killing Sudanese, committing sexual violence and destroying the economy.

In his assessment, opposition to the RSF’s political rehabilitation extends to broad sections of Sudanese society, and he expects the army and its allies to hold this position even in the face of US pressure or sanctions.

As for developments on the ground in Kordofan, he said they reflect the Sudanese army’s determination to reach the edges of Darfur, at the same time as moves begin to prepare for a political dialogue — one he expects to take a long time given the widening differences among Sudanese forces, including those allied with the army.

Omar explained that the army aims to link up with Sudanese forces stationed on the Chadian border, noting that the North Kordofan front is backed by another front in West Darfur, increasing the pressure on the RSF. He described North Darfur as a key point in determining the army’s lines of advance, as part of its efforts to dismantle the RSF’s presence in the remaining areas of Kordofan and push into Darfur.

On the political track, Omar said the Committee for Preparing the Sudanese–Sudanese Dialogue, formed in Khartoum and addressed by Sovereignty Council chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has begun meeting and working to identify the forces and figures it will reach out to in order to hear their views.

He added: “This is a committee to prepare the dialogue, not to conduct it. Its importance lies in turning Sudanese attention towards political solutions and opening a discussion on how to end the war and resolve internal disputes.”

Omar believes the political track has already begun but will take a long time, explaining that the disagreements are not limited to the army’s opponents; they extend to the forces fighting alongside it under the banner of the “War of Dignity”. Bringing these parties together and narrowing the gaps between them, he said, is one of the committee’s challenges.

On the other hand, he noted that opposition civilian forces — which he described as allied with the RSF — had declined Burhan’s invitation and boycotted the Khartoum meetings, objecting to the participation of groups they regard as “remnants” of the former regime.

In his assessment, these forces are pinning their hopes on international tracks, including the Quintet and Quad mechanisms, more than on the initiative launched in Khartoum.